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Abstract
This paper shows that the likelihood of post-acquisition CEO turnover can act as a constraint
on risky acquisition decisions. The acquisition premium in pay decreases by over 50% if the
dismissal risk is controlled for. Given a smaller pay premium for undertaking acquisitions and
a non-zero risk of dismissal, shareholders are shown to be able to exercise some control over
managerial incentives to engage in risky acquisitions through the mechanism for dismissal.
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1 Introduction
A widely held proposition in the nance and economics literature is that acquisition activities are
detrimental to shareholderswealth and the protability of the acquiring rms (Dickerson et al.
1997; Loghran and Vijh, 1997). Yet, in the last two decades there have been at least two periods
of heightened acquisition activities in the US. It is conjectured that acquisitions are motivated
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primarily by managerial incentives to increase rm size and to a lesser extent by considerations of
shareholder value (Jensen, 1986). This is a stylised result from the empirical literature on executive
pay, which suggests that pay-size sensitivity dominates the pay-performance sensitivity (Bebchuk
and Fried 2003; Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Gabaix and Landier 2008; Murphy 1999).
If pay is strongly associated with rm size, then increasing the size of the rm provides the
CEO with an opportunity to increase her own pay, even if it is at the cost of shareholderswealth.
A larger rm, along with tangible benets to CEO wealth, also generates non-pecuniary benets to
the CEO in terms of perquisites and lowering of the probability of their own rm being acquired.
Given that, one way to increase rm size is to undertake acquisitions, a utility maximizing CEO
may undertake acquisitions which are not in the interests of shareholders. Acquisitions also serve
as signals of managerial ability and may have an impact on the long-term earnings of the CEO
(Williamson 1963; Singh 1975).
Specically, this paper asks whether the threat of post-acquisition dismissal constrains the CEO
in seeking personal gain through the acquisition-premium in pay. Whilst share options are designed
to discourage bad acquisitions, Harford and Li (2007) nd that these to be largely ine¤ective.
Lehn and Zhao (2006) nd that 47% of CEOs of acquiring rms are replaced within 5 years of
an acquisition, with dismissal being more likely if the ex-post outcome of the turnover reduces
shareholderswealth. The likelihood of dismissal should constrain the misaligned incentives of the
CEO. The higher the probability of a post-acquisition dismissal, the lower is the incentive for a risk-
averse CEO to undertake an acquisition. Of course, this might be o¤set where the wage premium
is su¢ ciently large. Given that the agent has imperfect information of the ex-post likelihood of
dismissal, the implied probability of dismissal may have a strong disincentive e¤ect for undertaking
acquisitions.
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Existing literature does not control for the likelihood of CEO turnover in estimating the acqui-
sition premium in CEO pay. If the acquisition premium in CEO pay is a manifestation of agency
problem, then the threat of dismissal should act as a constraint for undertaking risky acquisitions.
Harford and Li (2007) allude to the possibility of survivor bias in the estimates of the acquisi-
tion pay premium. This arises from the commonly used empirical strategy to use a "sample of
bidding rms whose CEOs remained in place through at least 1 year following the acquisition".
The rationale for this strategy is that if a CEO is dismissed following an acquisition, a new CEO
is more likely to have a higher pay, so that the pay-premium would be over-estimated (Murphy
and Zabonjik, 2009). On the other hand, the exclusion of CEOs who lose their job following an
acquisition induces a survivor bias in estimates of the pay-premium.
This paper controls for post-acquisition dismissal using a Heckman-type selection model. The
median ex-ante severance pay eligibility within the same industry group 1 is used as an exclusion
restriction. The central idea is that a higher eligibility of severance pay within the same industry
group will impact upon the likelihood of dismissal of an individual CEO but not on pay. This
paper uses information from two waves of acquisitions, 1992-2000 and 2003-2008, to re-evaluate the
managerial incentive to undertake acquisitions. By documenting the e¤ect of dismissal risk on the
acquisition premium in CEO pay, this paper extends the work of Lehn and Zhao (2006).
For a sample of 2054 acquisitions undertaken by 1119 US rms over the period 1993-2011, this
paper examines the e¤ect of the dismissal constraint on a CEOs incentive to undertake acquisition
for a pay premium. The empirical evidence on whether acquisitions lead to a pay increase for the
CEO is inconclusive. Some studies nd that the CEOs of acquiring rms enjoy a post-acquisition
1The change in control pay is the ex-ante contracted eligibility of the CEO to receive a separation pay in
the event of dismissal following an acquisition. The exclusion restriction is the median eligibility of this pay
within a 2-digit industry classication. This is discussed in further details in sections 2&3.
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pay premium. Khorana and Zenner (1998) report that CEOs of acquiring rms receive a10.5% pay
premium compared to CEOs in comparable rms not undertaking acquisitions. The acquisition
pay premium tends to persist. Harford and Li (2007) nd that US CEOs enjoy post-acquisition
pay premiums. Girma, Thompson and Wright (2006) report a "pure" acquisition pay premium for
UK CEOs. In this strand of research, the post-acquisition premium in pay has been attributed to
the signaling e¤ect of managerial ability that is manifest in completion of acquisitions.
This paper suggests that if the likelihood of dismissal is accounted for, CEOs engaging in
value-destroying acquisitions are likely to su¤er a pay penalty. However, the empirical evidence on
di¤erential pay awards for good and bad acquisitions is mixed. Lambert and Larcker (1987) and
Girma et al. (2006) nd that CEOs engaging in bad acquisitions experience relatively lower pay.
In contrast, Guest (2009) nds a positive acquisition e¤ect on CEO pay irrespective of the e¤ect it
has on shareholderswealth.
Extant literature focuses only on the pay incentives of CEOs to undertake acquisitions. This
is the rst study to examine the incentive e¤ects of post-acquisition dismissal probability on ac-
quisition decisions. We also examine whether the alleged pay-premium for CEOs engaging in
value-destroying acquisitions persist if the likelihood of dismissal is controlled for.
Further, CEO dismissals may not be based solely on the stock market reaction to the announce-
ment of the acquisitions. In this paper, we use a longer term metric to classify wealth enhancing
and wealth reducinge¤ects of acquisitions. This allows us to extend the horizon of the impact of
an acquisition on shareholders wealth beyond the announcement e¤ect.
The central focus of this paper is to examine the interplay of the incentive e¤ects of the risk of
post-acquisition dismissal and a pay premium. If the threat of dismissal has a disincentive e¤ect
on the managerial decisions to undertake acquisitions, then the risk adjusted premium in CEO
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pay should be lower than the conventional estimates. Further, the dismissal risk should rise for
CEOs engaging in value-destroying acquisitions. Thus the risk-adjusted pay premium needs to be
much larger for the CEO to be motivated in undertaking a risky acquisition. We examine the how
probability of dismissal impacts upon the pay premium in events of value-destroying acquisitions.
Controlling for the likelihood of post-acquisition dismissal, the pay premium for acquiring CEOs
fall by over 50%. The xed e¤ect estimate of a pay premium of 4% is consistent with the ndings of
Bliss and Rosen (2001) and Harford and Li (2007); but that premium falls to 1.5% after controlling
for dismissal probability. Whilst the results of this paper still suggest a small premium in pay for
undertaking acquisitions, a risk-averse agent may not have su¢ cient incentives to undertake an
acquisition for a marginal increase in pay given the nite risk of dismissal. Given that acquiring
CEOs in our sample are 32% more likely to be dismissed, the imputed value of the pay-o¤ for the
CEO is likely to be much lesser if the risk-appetite is accounted for.
The survival-bias seems to be systematically present in both the cash and equity components
of pay. This extends the study by Grinstein and Hribar (2004) who nd that the acquisition
pay premium is driven by large bonuses. We nd evidence of survivor bias in bonus payouts.
Interestingly, there seems to be no pay premium for CEOs undertaking value-destroying acquisitions
if dismissal risk is accounted for. In fact, they su¤er a pay penalty of 3.3%. This suggests lower
incentives for a CEO to undertake a risky acquisition as it might lead to both higher dismissal
probability and a pay penalty.
If a long-term metric of performance is employed to classify ex-post outcomes of acquisitions,
the premium in pay for acquiring CEOs is further falls by 1%; and there is no signicant impact
on bonuses. Acquisitions that have a long-term negative impact on shareholderswealth lead to
almost 4% decrease in CEO pay.
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 examines the method-
ological issues and the empirical strategy. The results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5
concludes.
2 Data
The data used in this analysis are derived from Compustats ExecuComp database. For the sample
period 1993-2011, we use information on 2755 rms from the S&P 1500 listings. The key variables
for this analysis are described in details in the following paragraphs. Variable descriptions are
presented in Table 1 and the summary statistics of key variables are presented in Table 2.
CEO dismissals are identied from the Execucomp database, Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 lists,
the Wall Street Journal and Lexis/Nexis Business news database. Consistent with the denition
used by Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004), turnover means that a CEO who is observed in a rm
on October 1st of year t is not observed in the same rm on the same day of year t+1.2 Classifying
dismissal is di¢ cult as rms rarely state that they have red a CEO. Therefore, dismissals are
identied from press reports that a CEO was red, forced out or resigned due to internal pressures.
Cases where CEOs vacate their post but continue as the chairman of the board are not treated as
dismissal. The robustness of this classication technique was checked using an age-based algorithm:
CEOs below 55 years of age and who leave their jobs following an acquisition are classied as having
been dismissed. This method yields similar overall number of dismissals to the original method.
However, using an age-based classication may over-estimate the probability of dismissal below
the threshold and underestimate it otherwise. Since this might potentially bias the estimates, the
original classication technique is retained.
2We use October-September cycle to overlap with the DEF 14 A ling cycles.
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Information on stock price performance is obtained from the Centre for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP). The annual average value weighted return for a rm is benchmarked to the average
annual value weighted return of the median rm in the same 2-digit SIC code. The natural log
of annual sales is used as a measure of rm size3. The risk in a rms operating and information
environment is controlled for using the volatility in annual average stock returns.
Corporate governance data was obtained from the Risk Metrics database (formerly IRRC).
Corporate governance data are available for 1996-2011 and hence specications with corporate
governance controls contain fewer observations.
KEY VARIABLES:
Retention
Retention is a binary indicator for a CEO retaining her job for at least two years following
an acquisition. Of the 1119 rms engaging in acquisitions, 538 (48.08%) dismiss the acquiring
CEO within the rst two years of an acquisition4. In the same period, only 318 (19.43%) of 1636
non-acquiring rms dismiss their CEO. The raw data suggest a higher probability of CEO turnover
in acquiring rms. There may be a concern that acquiring rms and rms that dismiss the CEO
following an acquisition may be di¤erent on some observable characteristics. To attenuate that
concern, summary statistics for key variables are presented in Table 3, respectively for rms that
experience post-acquisition CEO dismissal and those that do not. On average, the acquiring rms
are larger than non-acquiring rms. In periods following an acquisition, CEO pay is 53.9% higher
than before the acquisition. However, there is a decrease in the acquiring rms protability after
undertaking an acquisition.
3Natural log of total assets and total market value of equity are used as alternative measures of rm size to test
the robustness of the baseline results.
4The number of post-acquisition dismissals is 443 if the age-based algorithm to classify dismissals is employed.
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Acquisitions
Acquisition is dened as an event where a bidding rm, with less than a 10% stake at the
target rm, seeks to own at least 50% of the target rm (Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Faccio, McConnell,
and Stolin, 2006)5. Such events are identied from Acquisition Weekly, Thomson One Banker and
Forbes company database. We follow the conventional selection method of acquisition samples
used in Lehn and Zhao (2006) and Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012). We use information on
successful acquisition bids by U.S. public rms announced between January, 1, 1992 and December,
31, 2010. Target rms can be U.S. rms- both public and private6. The sample is restricted to
public bidders, because acquisition decisions by public rms require stronger incentives for the CEO.
Public acquisitions also require more regulatory and shareholder approvals and generally exposes
the CEO to greater risks (Rhee and Valdez, 2009). We exclude all restructuring, leveraged buyouts,
privatization and bankruptcies leaving a sample of 24,677 events. For a meaningful acquisition, we
require the size of the target rm to be at least 10% of that of the acquiring rm. This yields a
sample of 15,598 events. Further, we require that the bidding rm is listed in both Execucomp and
CRSP, resulting in a sample of 14,992 transactions.
Finally, a materiality constraint of non-overlapping acquisitions was necessary to isolate the
lagged e¤ects of individual acquisitions on CEO pay where a sample rm undertakes multiple
closely spaced acquisitions. An overlap is dened as a gap of less than 24 months between the
announcements of two acquisitions7. The nal sample consists of 2,054 acquisitions undertaken by
5The event year is dened as the year of announcement of an acquisition.
6As a measure of robustness, we include acquisitions of foreign public rms by U.S. public rms. The results are
discussed in section 4.3.
7Robustness check was performed including the overlapping acquisitions in the dataset. The estimate on the
contemporaneous indicator for acquisition was (0.053) almost one-and-half percentage points higher than our baseline
estimates and signicant at 1% level. The higher estimated e¤ect of acquisition on CEO pay possibly reects the
overlapping e¤ects of closely timed acquisitions.
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1,119 rms.1,636 sample rms do not engage in any acquisitions.8
We control for the method of payment and the deal value of acquisitions. 38% acquisitions in
our sample are stock-nanced, 19% are cash-nanced, and the remaining 43% are nanced by a
combination of stocks and cash. The median (mean) deal value of the acquisitions in our sample is
US$ 177.23 million (US$ 1335.75 million).
Good and Bad Acquisitions
Acquisitions are evaluated on the basis of the response of the stock market to a successful bid
announcement over a 7 day period [ 3;+3].9. The announcement e¤ect is conventionally used as an
indicator for the market reaction to and the impact of an acquisition on the shareholderswealth.
The abnormal returns on the acquiring rms stocks were computed with respect to the returns
on the market index. 42% of the acquisitions in the sample have positive abnormal returns and
58% acquisitions are associated with negative abnormal returns. Following Khoranna and Zenner
(1998) and Girma et al. (2006), a bad acquisition is dened as an event for which CAR[ 3;+3]
around the announcement date is negative. From Table 5, 57.5% (1,194 out of 2,054) of sample
acquisitions have negative cumulative abnormal returns in the 7-day announcement window.10
CEO Pay
Execucomp reports a number of CEO pay measures. The conventional measure of total annual
compensation is TDC1 or TDC211 which is the linear summation of salary, bonus, and the value
of stock options, restricted stock grants, long term incentive payouts, and all other payments12.
8A further 284 transactions involve a target rm listed on overseas stock exchanges. We use this information as a
measure of robustness.
9The robustness of the results was tested using CAR[-1,+1] and CAR[-5,+5] as event windows to classify
bad acquisitions. The results are qualitatively similar.
10Robustness of the estimates was checked using CAR[-5,+5].
11Calculation of TDC1 uses the value of option grants and the calculation of TDC2 uses the value of options
exercised.
12All other payments include compensation that cant be categorised under the other heads. This may include
severance payments, debt forgiveness, signing bonuses, life insurance premiums, etc.
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A potential concern is that severance pay may be included in the calculation of CEO pay. This
concern arises from the inclusion of the aforementioned all other payments(ALLOTH variable in
Execucomp) in the calculation. To circumvent this problem, we exclude the all other payments
component from the calculation of the total annual compensation of the CEOs. Therefore our
measure of CEO pay is constructed from Execucomp as TDC2 ALLOTH.13 The mean (median)
annual compensation for the sample CEOs is US$ 4.3 million (1.6 million).
Severance Payment Eligibility
Severance payment eligibility is the ex-ante contracted eligibility of the CEO to receive a pay-
ment in the event of a dismissal following an acquisition. This was instituted in the 1980s to
encourage risk-taking among CEOs in the interests of the shareholder, even if it endangers their
jobs. In essence, a severance package is analogous to a put option which has been shown to be
e¤ective in reducing agency conicts (Ju, Leland, and Senbet, 2002). This is a one-o¤ payment
agreed upon at the beginning of the CEOs tenure and serves as an insurance aganist a fall in
rm value. However, it is not a regulatory requirement for rms to have a provision of severance
payment. Execucomp provides information on the severance payment eligibility of CEOs, which is
the estimated total payments to the executive in the event of an involuntary, without-cause ter-
mination. We primarily use the "TERM_PYMT" variable reported in Execucomp and also check
the robustness of our results using "CHG_CTRL_PYMT", which reports estimated payments in
the event of an involuntary termination due to a change in control. All reported estimates assume
that a termination occurrs on the last day of the scal year. Care has been taken to verify and
augment the Execucomp data with hand-collected information from the DEF-14A lings of rms
for each year of a new CEO appointment. 57% of sample rms provide the CEOs with an ex-ante
13We also check for the robustness of our results using 0TDC1 ALLOTH 0 as the measure of CEO annual
compensation.
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committment to severance pay, with a mean (median) of US$1.4 million (0.6 million).14 We es-
timate the median severance pay for industries at 2-digit SIC levels. Potential econometric issues
arising from the endogeneity of severance pay and CEO pay are discussed in section 3.
Governance Variables
Board Size and composition and CEO power is likely to impact upon the risk-taking behaviour
of CEOs (Pathan, 2008). Board size is measured as the number of directors on the board. Board
independence is measured using percentage of outside directors on the board. In addition, the
percentage shareholding of the CEO in the rm is a likely indicator of CEO power. On the other
hand, a higher percentage share ownership of the CEO may also align the interests of the CEO
with that of the shareholders. Either way, it is likely to be impact upon the strength of governance.
We also control for CEO tenure as another measure of CEO power.
3 Methodology
The central focus of this paper is to examine whether the post-acquisition dismissal probability
is reected in the acquisition pay premium. Several econometric issues need to be considered in
designing an empirical strategy. A key issue is partial observability: if a CEO is dismissed post
acquisition, their ex-post pay is not observed. On the other hand, if the acquisition pay premium
is calculated only on surviving CEOs, it is likely to be upward biased. One approach would be to
set the pay of all dismissed CEO equal to zero and estimate the pay premium. However, this might
overcorrect the bias given the large drop in the pay15. In addition, it would not be possible to
14A probit test was performed to check the nature of prevalence of the change in control pay eligibility. There is
insu¢ cient evidence to suggest that rms that provide a contractual change in control pay eligibility are systematically
di¤erent on observable characteristics.
15As a measure of checking the robustness of our empirical strategy, we set the pay of CEOs who are dismissed
following an acquisition to be zero and estimated the acquisition pay premium. The results are presented in Appendix
1, and suggests a large pay penalty for undertaking acquisitions.
11
interpret lagged pay impacts of acquisitions, because the CEO would have changed. A comparison
of the pre- and post-acquisition sample is provided in Table 3. Our approach is therefore to use
a Heckman-type selection framework to address the partial observability issue. First, we estimate
the probability of CEO retention following an acquisition. We attempt to correct for the survivor
bias in the CEO acquisition pay premium by using the predicted probability of retention as an
explanatory variable in the second-stage pay regressions.
A second econometric issue is to dene an appropriate exclusion restriction. This is because
many of the determinants of the probability of retention are also likely to impact upon CEO pay.
The identication strategy of this paper is based on the median severance entitlement of CEOs in
the event of a turnover caused by change in control within a 2-digit SIC level. It might be argued
that the severance pay eligibility and CEO pay are co-determined at the beginning of the tenure.
The implication would then be that the severance pay eligibility is not a valid instrument, even
though the correlation coe¢ cient between the ex-ante severance pay eligibility and CEO pay is 0.14
and not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
We attenuate this concern by using the median ex-ante severance pay eligibility of the CEOs
in a given 2-digit industry code in the event of a CEO dismissal following acquisitions. A priori, a
higher industry median of severance pay eligibility is associated with a higher probability of post-
acquisition CEO retention; i.e. it is more expensive for rms to hire new CEOs. However, the
industry median of severance pay in the same industry is unlikely to impact upon any individual
CEOs pay. Severance payment is only relevant when post-acquisition CEO turnover is under
consideration, and it is likely to impact upon the CEO pay only through its e¤ect on survival
probability.
It is plausible that CEOs undertake acquisitions to increase their pay whilst knowing that a
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dismissal would lead to a lump-sum payment. In that case, the eligibility of severance pay will
be contributing to managerial decision making in undertaking acquisitions. Zhao (2013) suggests
that severance pay provisions does not provide managers with perverse incentives in acquisition
decisions. From Table 2, the median severance pay is approximately 38% of the median CEO
pay, which is unlikely to motivate a CEO to undertake a risky acquisition. This is because the
incentive e¤ect of a continuous stream of high pay is likely to dominate any incentive e¤ect of a
one-o¤ separation pay. It may yet be conceivable that in certain situations, the incentive e¤ects are
reversed: a one-o¤ separation pay may provide more utility to the CEO than continued annual pay.
This is likely to be the case for CEOs nearing retirement for whom the stream of future income
is truncated. The incentives of CEOs nearing retirement are reportedly di¤erent due to shorter
horizon of decision making (Antia, et al. 2010; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Matta and Beamish,
2008). The analysis of this paper is based on the sub-sample of acquisitions not undertaken within
the last two years of a CEOs tenure. Whilst this leads to a 7% loss in the number of acquisitions,
this allows us to study the incentive e¤ects of undertaking acquisitions where the CEOs incentive
horizon is not truncated by impending retirement. In short, there is no strong reason to suspect
that a CEO will undertake a risky acquisition being motivated by the one-o¤ severance pay as the
better outcome.
Ideally, a test for instrument validity is useful to address any concerns about the exogeneity
of the instruments. There are no readily available tests for the validity of exclusion restrictions
in Heckman selection models. From Table 3, there is no signicant di¤erence in the eligibility of
severance payments between the acquiring and the non-acquiring rms. To attenuate the concern
that CEO pay and industry median of severance pay might co-vary, Table 4 presents the median
CEO pay at di¤erent quartiles of the distribution of industry medians of severance pay. There is
13
no evidence of association between the two variables16. The only signicant di¤erence of median
values is for rm size: CEOs of large rms seem to have a higher severance payment eligibility.
Moreover, regression estimates of the industry average of severance pay eligibility on total CEO
pay and on the probability of CEO turnover suggest that severance pay eligibility is signicantly
(and negatively) associated with probability of the latter (p value = 0.005) but has an insignicant
e¤ect on the former (p value = 0.244). All the above evidence suggests that the exclusion restriction
is associated with the probability of turnover but not CEO pay. In section 4.3, we discuss robustness
checks of the exclusion restriction and the estimation technique.
In the rst-stage, we estimate the probability of an acquiring CEO retaining her job after the
event, using covariates for rm-level and CEO-level characteristics and entitlement of severance
pay as the exclusion restriction. The baseline empirical model specication is as follows:
LnPayit = + 1FirmP erf ormanceit+Salesit+3Xit+4Acquisitionit
+5Acquisitionit  Salesit + 6 + ( \retentionit) + f i+ht+"it (1)




ifzit + it > 0
Otherwise
(2)
zit contains all the observable parameters of rm performance, rm size, CEO tenure, corporate
governance measures and industry classications that contribute to the probability of retention of
the CEO in the event of an acquisition and it represents the exclusion restriction.
The coe¢ cient 1 is an estimate of the e¤ect of rm performance on CEO pay. Return on assets
16The pairwise correlation coe¢ cient is 0.09 and is not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
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(ROAit) and Market-to-Book Value (MTBV it) is used to control for rm performance. Consistent
with the existing literature, historical rm performance is associated with post-acquisition pay up
to two lag periods. We therefore control for two lags of rm performance (Geddes and Vinod, 1997;
Girma, Thompson and Wright, 2006).
Salesit is used as the measure of rm size.17 It is di¢ cult to decompose sales into "organic
sales" and increases in sales due to acquisition, particularly because data on cross border targets
are often not available. 4 captures the bias-corrected acquisition e¤ect on CEO pay. If acquisitions
are associated with a rise in CEO pay, the coe¢ cients on the Acquisitionit (and its lags) would
show as signicant and positive. Acquisitionit is an indicator which equals 1 if an event of
acquisition is announced in a given year18. The use of lagged indicators for acquisitions is expected
to yield qualitatively similar results to those obtained from dynamic panel models. 3 captures
the e¤ects of all other observable rm performance measures contained in the vector, Xit. The
standard deviation of monthly stock returns () over a given year is used to control for the risk in
a rms information and operating environment. fi and ht control for rm and year xed e¤ects,
respectively. The estimation reports robust standard errors that are clustered at rm level.
It might be argued that an increase in rm size through acquisition enhances CEO incentives,
given that the pay-size relationship is known to dominate pay-performance sensitivity. Therefore,
we use an interaction of AcquisitionitSalesit to control for the size e¤ect of acquisition.
Next, we examine whether survivor bias can account for di¤erential pay awards for ex-post
value-enhancing and value-destroying acquisitions. In equation (3), the baseline specication
is augmented with an indicator (NegativeRe turnit) for bad acquisition, which equals 1 for
17Qualitatively similar results are obtained using log of Total Assets as measures of rm size.
18We do not separately control for multiple acquisitions undertaken in a given year: the indicator for Acquisition
equals 1 for any number of events.
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CAR[ 3;+3] < 0:Further, an interaction of NegativeRe turnit with Acquisitionit is added to
the baseline specication. If the reported pay-premium for undertaking a bad acquisition can
be accounted for by survivor-bias, the estimate of the Acquisitionit  NegativeRe turnit will be
statistically insignicant.
LnPayit = + 1ROAit + 2Re tit + 3Salesit + 4Acquisitionit+ (3)
+ 5NegativeRe turnit + 6(Acquisitionit NegativeRe turnit) + 7
+ fi + ht + "it
Finally, the mechanism of the acquisition premium in CEO pay may be a consequence of higher
bonus payouts (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). To examine the survivor bias in disaggregated mea-
sures of pay, the baseline specication was re-estimated using bonus as the dependent variable.
If there is no survivor bias in bonus, it would appear that the post-acquisition pay premium is
manifest in bonus payouts.
4 Results And Analysis
4.1 Is there a Survivor Bias in the acquisition premium in CEO pay?
In Table 6, column (1) presents the results of the selection equation and column (2) reports the
estimates from outcome equation. Column (3) presents the xed e¤ects estimates of the impact of
acquisitions on CEO pay without correcting for survivor-bias. The Wald test of independent equa-
tions (H0 :  = 0) tests if the Heckman selection model is appropriate for the system of equations.
The association parameter for our system of equations is positive ( = 0.215) and statistically sig-
nicant (robust standard error= 0:0402): any parameter that increases the probability of retention
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in the event of an acquisition also increases the post-acquisition CEO pay.
From the rst-stage estimation, the exclusion restriction is signicant and positive, which sup-
ports the hypothesis that a higher industry average of severance payment eligibility lowers the
probability of CEO turnover.19 More importantly, acquiring CEOs seem to have a higher likelihood
of turnover. Acquiring CEOs are 35% less likely to be retained compared to their non-acquiring
counterparts. The likelihood of turnover is signicant in the year following an acquisition. These
suggest that the likelihood of post-acquisition turnover may carry incentive e¤ects for undertaking
acquisitions. The size and composition of the board signicantly a¤ects the likelihood of retention:
large boards with a lower percentage of outside directors are less likely to dismiss a CEO. A higher
percentage share ownership of the CEO also decreases the likelihood of dismissal.
The impact of the predicted probability of dismissal is used in estimating the acquisition pay
premium. Not surprisingly, there is a positive and statistically signicant association between
probability of retention and pay. The focus of this analysis is the impact of acquisition on pay
when the probability of retention is controlled for. Undertaking an acquisition leads to a 1.7%
increase in CEO pay, and the acquisition pay premium persists in the year following an acquisition.
However, this estimate of the acquisition pay premium is signicantly lower than the xed e¤ects
estimates (4 pp.) as presented in column (3). The "pure" acquisition premium in pay is reduced
by over 50% when the likelihood of post-acquisition turnover is controlled for. There seems to be a
survivor bias in the standard xed e¤ects estimates of the acquisition premium. Given a non-zero
risk of dismissal following an acquisition (Lehn and Zhao, 2006), the small pay premium of 1.8%
may be insu¢ ciently strong as an incentive for a risk-neutral CEO to undertake an acquisition.
The estimate of AcquisitionitTotalAssetsit is positive and signicant, suggesting that CEOs do
19This result is robust to the severance pay variable used. Both TERM_PYMT and CHG_CTRL_PYMT produce
similar estimates.
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gain in pay for the increase in rm size through acquisition20. However, the magnitude of the e¤ect
is of similar order of magnitude as the "pure" acquisition premium in pay. Therefore we expect
them to have similar incentive e¤ects.
The estimates on covariates for rm size, rm performance and board characteristics are con-
sistent with earlier literature: CEO pay is higher in larger rms with large and less independent
boards. Further, it is of interest to understand how the survivor bias a¤ects disaggregated measures
of pay. We examine the survivor bias in the post-acquisition CEO bonus. The results are presented
in Table 7: estimates of the bias-corrected premium are presented in column (2). There is a 2%
premium in bonus for acquiring CEOs, which persists for the year following acquisitions. The
xed e¤ects estimate of the acquisition premium in bonus is 5.1% as presented in column (3). The
premium in bonus payouts is reduced by 60% when the likelihood of post-acquisition turnover
is controlled for. It seems that the survivor bias in the acquisition premia is systematic across
di¤erent measures of pay awards. All other covariates retain their expected sign and signicance.
4.2 Does survivor bias account for the pay premium for bad acquisitions?
To examine how survivor bias a¤ects post-acquisition pay premium for CEOs undertaking bad
acquisitions, the baseline specication is augmented with NegativeRe turnit and Acquisitionit 
NegativeRe turnit. The objective is to investigate further if good and bad acquisitions are similarly
rewarded, providing the CEO with an incentive to engage in value-destroying acquisitions. If there
is survivor-bias in the acquisition pay premium for CEOs engaging in value-destroying acquisitions,
then the incentive e¤ects of undertaking risky acquisitions for pay increase are further reduced.
The results are presented in Table 8.
20The results are qualitatively similar for the alternative measures of rm performance.
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The estimate of NegativeRe turnit is negative and borderline signicant at the 5% level. The
coe¢ cient of the interaction term Acquisitionit  NegativeRe turnit is negative and signicant:
CEOs undertaking bad acquisitions su¤er a contemporaneous pay decrease. These results suggest
that risky acquisitions may not result in any pay gain for the CEO and if the likelihood of post-
acquisition dismissal is controlled for, CEOs engaging in acquisitions that do not gain the approval
of the market are likely to be penalised. This result is not consistent with the managerial power
theory which suggests that CEOs are rewarded for undertaking an acquisition, irrespective of the
ex-post nancial outcome of the event. This suggests an important limitation to the motivations of
a CEO in undertaking an acquisition. Under imperfect information about the ex-post likelihood of
dismissal and possible pay loss, a utility maximizing risk-averse CEO has little monetary incentive
to undertake a risky acquisition. It appears that the likelihood of post-acquisition dismissal acts as
a tool of incentive alignment.
Finally, using Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR[ 3;+3]) around the announcement date
to categorize value-enhancingand value-destroyingacquisitions may provide a short-term statis-
tic to estimate the wealth e¤ects of an acquisition. The horizon of the performance e¤ect of the
acquisition and the unvested equity options of the CEO may extend beyond the announcement
e¤ect (Vijh 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). To control for the long-term impact of acquisi-
tions, we use the annualised value-weighted returns of a rm benchmarked to similar rms. The
benchmarking is done by sorting sample rms into quartiles of size and value (MTBV) within the
2-digit SIC-code. A sample rms annualized returns are benchmarked to the median of that of the
rms that are included in exactly the same sub-groups for both the variable. If the benchmarked
return in an event year is negative, the event is classied as a bad acquisition. The indicator
NegativeV alueWeightedRe turnit equals 1if the annual value weighted return of the acquiring
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rm is lower than the value weighted return of the median rm in the same 2-digit SIC code. The
results presented in Table 9 are qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates. It appears that the
results are not driven by the empirical strategy to classify bad acquisitions.
4.3 Robustness Issues
We undertake a range of robustness checks for our baseline estimates. The acquiring rms may not
be a randomly selected subsample and the decisions to undertake acquisitions may be endogenous.
If the omitted variables simultaneously impact upon acquisition decisions and the pay premium, the
baseline estimates are potentially biased. We seek to circumvent this problem in two ways. First, we
use rm xed e¤ects to mitigate potential bias due to time invariant omitted variables. Secondly, the
probability of a rm undertaking an acquisition is instrumented using CEO tenure and an indicator
for whether the rm has undertaken acquisition(s) in the previous two years. AcquisitionHistory
equals 1if a sample rm has undertaken one or more acquisition in the previous two years and
0otherwise. We chose these instruments because CEO tenure may a¤ect the entrenchment of
the CEO and hence his decision to undertake an acquisition. Similarly, prior acquisition history
may be a predictor of the likelihood of future acquisitions. This instrumentation strategy yields
estimates that are qualitatively similar to the xed e¤ects21. The results are available but is not
presented here in the interests of brevity.
The acquisition pay premium may vary by the size of the acquisition deal and the mode of
nancing. We control for the nature of nancing of the acquisition and the deal size. A larger deal
is associated with higher CEO pay but the main results appear not to be a¤ected by the deal size
and the mode of acquisition nancing. The results are presented in Appendix 2.
21We also check the robustness of our results using the interaction of the industry average severance pay eligibility
and rm size as the exclusion restriction. The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates.
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Further, it may be argued that the incentive e¤ects of NegativeReturnit are non-linear: mean-
ingful incentives only stem from larger negative abnormal returns. Therefore to include only sta-
tistically meaningful e¤ects, we reclassify bad acquisitions as those for which NegativeReturnit is
above the 25th percentile. The point estimate of the reclassied AcquisitionitNegativeReturnit is
larger (7.8% compared to 3.3% in the baseline estimate) and is signicant at the 5% level. The
results are presented in the Appendix.3.
There might also be concern that the mean severance pay eligibility is correlated with other
industry level variations that might impact pay. We estimate the system of equations (1) and (2)
with industry xed e¤ects rather than rm xed e¤ects. The results are qualitatively similar to our
baseline estimates. Finally, we also test if the results vary for diversifying acquisitions. Once again,
the results are very similar to our baseline estimates. The results are omitted in the interests of
brevity.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines survivor bias in the CEO acquisition pay premium for a large sample of
US rms over the period 1993-2011. Controlling for the likelihood of post-acquisition takeover,
we nd evidence of survivor bias in earlier estimates of the acquisition pay premium. Consistent
with the extant literature, we nd that acquiring CEOs are paid more than their non-acquiring
counterparts but that the magnitude of the pay premium is reduced by over 50% if the likelihood
of post-acquisition CEO turnover is controlled for. If survivor bias is corrected for, there is no pay
premium for a CEO engaging in a value-destroying acquisition, and indeed, she su¤ers a decline in
pay.
Given that the likelihood of post-acquisition dismissal is not known to the risk-averse CEO
21
ex-ante and that in controlling for this likelihood, the pay premium is quite small, the managerial
incentive to undertake risky acquisitions is low. Moreover, controlling for dismissal risk, there is no
premium in pay for a CEO who undertakes a value-destroying acquisition. These results contradict
the managerial power hypothesis. If a CEO has little incentive in undertaking a risky acquisition to
increase pay, an interesting area for future research is to examine competing hypotheses to explain
the decision making of managers in undertaking risky acquisitions.
It is worth noting that the results of this paper are in no way suggestive of an e¢ cient principal-
agent arrangement. CEOs routinely undertake risky and value-destroying acquisitions. This paper
contributes to the literature in suggesting that incentives for undertaking bad decisions may lie
elsewhere and that pay enhancement may not be a su¢ ciently strong motivation if the likelihood of
dismissal is accounted for. Future research could focus on non-monetary incentives for undertaking
acquisitions. This paper further contributes to the literature by suggesting that shareholders are
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Table 1: Variable Description and Sources
In this table, we describe the key variables used in the empirical analysis and the sources of the
data. The main databases used are WRDS Execucomp, CRSP and Risk Metrics.
Variables Descriptions Source
Retention Indicator for event of CEO is retained following acquisition Execucomp
Tenure Length of CEO tenure in a rm (in Years) Execucomp
CEO Pay Salary + Bonus + Value of options + LTIP + RSU Execucomp
in 000 US$
Value Weighted Weighted average of all stock returns,weights given by CRSP
Return the market value of the stock issue (price * shares outstanding)
at the end of the previous trading period.
Benchmarked Value Di¤erence in rms annual value weighted return to Authors
Weighted Return that of the median rm in the matched comparators. Calculation
 Standard Deviation of the annual stock prices Authors
Calculation
Acquisition Event by which a rm increases its voting shares in another Multiple
rm to 50% or more. Sources
Firm Size Natural log of Sales Execucomp
Severance Payment Ex-Ante Contracted Severance Pay entitlement of the CEO Execucomp
Eligibility in events of turnover following acquisitions, 000 US$ DEF 14A
Percentage Share Percentage of equity holdings of an Execucomp
Ownership individual CEO in a rm
Board Size Number of Directors on a board RiskMetrics
Board Independence Percentage of outside Directors on the board RiskMetrics
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
This table presents the descriptive statistics of key variables for the full sample period
The key variables of interest are CEO Pay and Severance payment
eligibility.
N Mean Median SD Max Min
CEO pay (000 US$) 16621 4306.51 1604.09 10257.00 295136.40 0.01
ROA (000 US$) 16621 2.49 3.76 42.69 3551.35 -1314.88
Average Value 16265 0.0041 0.0111 0.0488 0.1105 -0.1846
weighted Return
Severance 16581 1411.34 614.01 787.56 241089.80 0.00
Payment (000 US$)
Sale (000 US$) 16621 4090.80 902.71 13799.02 42507189.00 0.03
CEO Share 16544 0.7031 0.00 3.84 88.20 0.00
Ownership (%)
Board Size 13022 9.48 9.03 2.65 34.00 3.00
Outside Directors (%) 13022 70.40 71.34 16.88 92.30 55.60
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Following Acquisitions
This table presents the summary statistics for acquiring and non-acquiring rms to address
potential endogeneity in undertaking acquisitions. The summary statistics for the Control
Group of rms and acquiring rms in periods before acquisitions are qualitatively similar.
Acquiring Firms Control Group
Periods Before Acquisition Periods After Acquisition
Variables Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
ROAit 2.99 21.75 2.07 15.33 2.34 34.28
MTBVit 2.45 5.71 2.12 5.90 2.48 4.88
CEO Pay 3687.44 1323.46 5722.05 2202.39 3204.10 945.43
Sales 4324.26 5442.80 7210.76 4865.22 3123.11 3553.04
Severance Pay 3230.58 1076.23 3314.44 1187.93 3157.56 2544.50
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Table 4: Distribution of Key Variables with
Severance Pay Eligibility
This table presents the median values of key variables at di¤erent quartiles of eligibility of
severance payment. There seems to be no evidence to suggest that the median CEO pay
co-varies with severance payment. The only signicant di¤erence is in median rm size,
suggesting that CEOs of larger rms have a higher eligibility of severance payment. The
signicant di¤erences are highlighted by :
Severance Payment Eligibility
Variable 0-25% 25-50% Di¤erence p-value 50-75% Di¤erence p-value
Median CEO Pay 1311.62 1400.82 89.2 0.173 1513.47 112.65 0.194
Median ROA 3.66 3.70 0.4 0.230 3.77 0.7 0.251
Median MTBV 2.06 2.44 0.38 0.188 2.93 0.49 0.175
Median Sale 774.13 6899.40 6125.27 0.032 14348.00 7448.6 0.040
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Table 5: Distribution of
Acquisitions Across Time
In this table, we present the distribution of
acquisitions and acquisitions with negative
announcement e¤ect over sample period.























Table 6: Bias-Corrected Acquisition Premium in CEO Pay
In this table we present the estimates of acquisition premium in CEO pay,
correcting for survivor bias. In columns (1) and (2) we present the
estimates of the Heckman Selection model and in column (3) we report
the xed e¤ects estimates. The dependant variables for each column is
mentioned below. *, **, *** indicate signicance at 10%, 5%and 1%
levels respectively. The p-values are given in the brackets.




Dependent CEO Retention Log Pay Log Pay
Variable
ROAit 0.041 0.015* 0.038
(0.000) (0.049) (0.071)
ROAit 1 0.033 0.023 0.016
(0.011) (0.233) (0.064)
MTBVit 0.020 0.008 0.005
(0.055) (0.057) (0.081)
MTBVit 1 0.013 0.000 0.001
(0.272) (0.231) (0.248)
 -0.011 0.126 0.114
(0.052) (0.003) (0.007)
Firm Size 0.031 0.364 0.391
(Ln Sales) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitionit -0.325 0.015 0.038
(0.000) (0.010) (0.013)
Acquisitionit 0.003 0.061* 0.019**
Firm Size (0.376) (0.058) (0.018)
Acquisitionit 1 -0.281 0.018 0.031
(0.024) (0.011) (0.025)




CEO Tenure 0.000 0.001 0.009
(0.112) (0.088) (0.040)
Percentage Share 0.011 0.004 0.007
Ownership (0.015) (0.010) (0.002)
Board Size 0.949 0.127 0.028
(0.009) (0.012) (0.000)
Board -1.121 -0.051 -0.034
Independence (0.036) (0.016) (0.016)
No. of Observations 13022 13022 13022
 0.229
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Table 7: Bias-Corrected Acquisition Premium in CEO Bonus
In this table we present the estimates of survivor. bias in the post-acquisition
bonus pay. In columns (1) and (2) we present the estimates of the Heckman
Selection model and in column (3) we report the xed e¤ects estimates. The
dependant variables for each column is mentioned below. *, **, *** indicate
signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The pvalues are
given in the brackets.




Dependent CEO Retention Log Bonus Log Bonus
Variable
ROAit 0.041 0.016 0.037
(0.000) (0.050) (0.058)
ROAit 1 0.033 0.019 0.018
(0.011) (0.319) (0.060)
MTBVit 0.020 0.008 0.007
(0.055) (0.056) (0.049)
MTBVit 1 0.013 0.001 0.000
(0.272) (0.248) (0.240)
Re t -0.011 0.122 0.198
(0.052) (0.012) (0.009)
Firm Size 0.031 0.403 0.454
(Ln Sales) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitionit -0.325 0.020 0.053
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitionit 1 -0.281 0.012 0.036
(0.024) (0.012) (0.010)
Acquisitionit 2 -0.021 0.009 0.013
(0.233) (0.208) (0.155)
Acquisitionit 0.003 0.084 0.021
Firm Size (0.376) (0.045) (0.016)
Change in Control 0.026 0.008
Pay (0.008) (0.437)
Percentage Share 0.011 0.007 0.012
Ownership (0.015) (0.015) (0.004)
CEO Tenure 0.000 0.001 0.014*
(0.112) (0.169) (0.076)
Board Size 0.949 0.118 0.022
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
Board -1.121 -0.061 -0.030
Independence (0.036) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Observations 13022 13022 13022
 0.237
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Table 8: Acquisition Premium in CEO Pay
by Acquisition Performance
In this table we present the estimates of acquisition premium in
CEO pay,correcting for the likelihood of post-acquisition CEO
turnover. In columns (1) and (2) we present the estimates of the
Heckman Selection model and in column (3) we report the xed
e¤ects estimates. The dependant variables for each column is
mentioned below. Here we present the results of the e¤ect of
acquisition outcomes on the pay premium using an indicator to
classify bad acquisitions.




Dependent CEO Retention Log Pay Log Pay
Variable
ROAit 0.036 0.012 0.032
(0.000) (0.045) (0.059)
ROAit 1 0.028 0.010 0.018
(0.077) (0.236) (0.077)
MTBVit 0.014 0.009 0.008
(0.011) (0.072) (0.071)
MTBVit 1 0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.212) (0.228) (0.224)
Re t -0.011 0.127 0.121
(0.053) (0.010) (0.011)
Firm Size 0.033 0.385 0.394
(Ln Sales) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitionit -0.351 0.018 0.039
(0.000) (0.021) (0.011)
Acquisitionit 1 -0.037 0.014 0.021
(0.028) (0.017) (0.014)
Acquisitionit 2 -0.000 0.005 0.008
(0.208) (0.227) (0.210)
Negative Returnit -0.068 0.009 0.015
(0.054) (0.296) (0.213)
Acquisitionit* -0.047 -0.033 -0.014
Negative Returnit (0.021) (0.015) (0.273)
Change in Control 0.028 0.009
Pay (0.013) (0.327)
Percentage Share 0.019 0.006 0.005
Ownership (0.026) (0.024) (0.010)
CEO Tenure 0.002 0.003 0.008
(0.187) (0.061) (0.082)
Board Size 0.954 0.137 0.027
(0.015) (0.024) (0.000)
Board -1.121 -0.045 -0.033
Independence (0.037) (0.011) (0.019)
No. of Observations 13022 13022 13022
 0.215
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Table 9: Acquisition Premium based on
longer term acquisition performance
In this table we present the estimates of acquisition premium in CEO
pay,correcting for the likelihood of post-acquisition CEO turnover.
In columns (1) and (2) we present the estimates of the Heckman
Selection model and in column (3) we report the xed e¤ects
estimates. The dependant variables for each column is mentioned
below. Here we present the results of the e¤ect of acquisition
outcomes on the pay premium using a long term metric to classify
bad acquisitions.




Dependent CEO Retention Log Pay Log Pay
Variable
ROAit 0.028 0.017 0.035
(0.010) (0.066) (0.059)
ROAit 1 0.014 0.013 0.018
(0.133) (0.267) (0.071)
MTBVit 0.015 0.005 0.013
(0.020) (0.055) (0.073)
MTBVit 1 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.263) (0.205) (0.220)
Re t -0.016 0.147 0.119
(0.041) (0.017) (0.016)
Firm Size 0.043 0.360 0.392
(Ln Sales) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitionit -0.334 0.013 0.035
(0.017) (0.010) (0.014)
Acquisitionit 1 -0.112 0.013 0.022
(0.032) (0.025) (0.015)
Acquisitionit 2 -0.001 0.005 0.007
(0.258) (0.239) (0.223)
Negative Benchmarked -0.048 0.008 0.018
Returnit (0.067) (0.264) (0.216)
Acquisitionit* Negative -0.044 -0.037 -0.005
Benchmarked Returnit (0.013) (0.014) (0.273)
Change in Control 0.028 0.004
Pay (0.016) (0.329)
Percentage Share 0.027 0.004 0.006
Ownership (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.004 0.022**
(0.103) (0.084) (0.027)
Board Size 0.927 0.128 0.026
(0.038) (0.019) (0.000)
Board -1.113 -0.055 -0.037
Independence (0.030) (0.012) (0.016)




Appendix 1: Alternate Method of
Estimating Acquisition Premium
In this table we present the estimates of acquisition premium in
CEO pay, correcting for survivor bias. In columns (1) and (2) we
present the estimates of the Heckman Selection model and in
column (3) we report the xed e¤ects estimates. The dependant
variables for each column is mentioned below. *, **, ***
indicate signicance at 10%, 5%and 1% levels respectively.
The p-values are given in the brackets.
Parameters Departing Baseline Fixed E¤ects
CEOPay = 0 Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Log Pay Log Pay Log Pay
Variable
ROAit 0.237 0.015* 0.038
(0.015) (0.049) (0.071)
ROAit 1 0.199 0.023 0.016
(0.018) (0.233) (0.064)
MTBVit 0.096 0.008 0.005
(0.069) (0.057) (0.081)
MTBVit 1 0.081 0.000 0.001
(0.144) (0.231) (0.248)
 0.185 0.126 0.114
(0.020) (0.003) (0.007)
Firm Size 0.712 0.364 0.391
(Ln Sales) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitionit -1.357 0.015 0.038
(0.000) (0.010) (0.013)
Acquisitionit -0.015 0.009* 0.019**





Severance Pay 0.024 0.012
Eligibility (0.281) (0.309)
Percentage Share 0.038 0.001 0.009
Ownership (0.017) (0.088) (0.040)
CEO Tenure 0.004 0.007
(0.010) (0.002)
Board Size 0.287 0.127 0.028
(0.015) (0.012) (0.000)
Board -0.091 -0.051 -0.034
Independence (0.033) (0.016) (0.016)
No. of Observations 13022 13022 13022
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Appendix 2: Acquisition Premium controlling
for Deal Characteristics
In this table we present the estimates of acquisition premium in
CEO pay,correcting for the likelihood of post-acquisition CEO
turnover. In columns (1) and (2) we present the estimates of the
Heckman Selection model and in column (3) we report the xed
e¤ects estimates. The dependant variables for each column is
mentioned below. Here we present the results of the e¤ect of
acquisition outcomes on the pay premium using an indicator
to classify bad acquisitions.




Dependent CEO Retention Log Pay Log Pay
Variable
ROAit 0.028 0.012* 0.034
(0.000) (0.067) (0.060)
ROAit 1 0.027 0.010 0.016
(0.079) (0.327) (0.072)
MTBVit 0.014 0.009 0.008
(0.021) (0.072) (0.070)
MTBVit 1 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.212) (0.222) (0.220)
Re t -0.011 0.119 0.118
(0.058) (0.014) (0.017)
Firm Size 0.044 0.373 0.385
(Ln Sales) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitionit -0.356 0.018 0.039
(0.000) (0.021) (0.011)
Acquisitionit 1 -0.025 0.016 0.024
(0.031) (0.026) (0.019)
Negative Returnit -0.077 0.004 0.013
(0.056) (0.323) (0.218)
Acquisitionit* -0.061 -0.027 -0.006
Negative Returnit (0.011) (0.011) (0.294)
Deal Size 0.023 0.019 0.009
(0.055) (0.050) (0.073)
Cash 0.826 0.003 0.001
Transaction (0.334) (0.224) (0.178)
Severance Pay 0.019 0.004
Eligibility (0.017) (0.343)
Percentage Share 0.011 0.001 0.003
Ownership (0.020) (0.013) (0.011)
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.004 0.009
(0.204) (0.088) (0.060)
Board Size 0.956 0.118 0.022
(0.013) (0.021) (0.000)
Board -1.117 -0.044 -0.035
Independence (0.039) (0.010) (0.013)
No. of Observations 13022 13022 13022
 0.233
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Appendix 3: Acquisition Premium-Alternate
Classication of Negative Returns
CEO pay, correcting for survivor bias. In columns (1) and (2) we
present the estimates of the Heckman Selection model and in
column (3) we report the xed e¤ects estimates. The dependant
variables for each column is mentioned below. *, **, ***
indicate signicance at 10%, 5%and 1% levels respectively. The
p-values are given in the brackets.




Dependent CEO Retention Log Pay Log Pay
Variable
ROAit 0.034 0.012* 0.032
(0.000) (0.059) (0.068)
ROAit 1 0.027 0.010 0.018
(0.019) (0.354) (0.077)
MTBVit 0.014 0.006 0.008
(0.057) (0.071) (0.074)
MTBVit 1 0.010 0.000 0.001
(0.244) (0.218) (0.227)
 -0.008 0.119 0.115
(0.060) (0.005) (0.003)
Firm Size 0.038 0.373 0.385
(Ln Sales) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitionit -0.348 0.017 0.039
(0.000) (0.012) (0.010)
Negative Returnit -0.096** 0.012 0.018
(0.045) (0.198) (0.232)
Acquisitionit* 0.008 0.078 -0.017
Negative Returnit (0.408) (0.015) (0.163)
Acquisitionit 1 -0.022 0.016 0.024
(0.034) (0.013) (0.019)
Acquisitionit 2 -0.004 0.009 0.017
(0.208) (0.033) (0.012)
Severance Pay 0.019 0.008
Eligibility (0.010) (0.318)
Percentage Share 0.014 0.001 0.003
Ownership (0.023) (0.017) (0.011)
CEO Tenure 0.003 0.006 0.009*
(0.189) (0.081) (0.064)
Board Size 0.973 0.111 0.022
(0.014) (0.018) (0.000)
Board -1.132 -0.047 -0.035
Independence (0.045) (0.021) (0.013)
No. of Observations 13022 13022 13022
 0.221
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